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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S FIRST
SEPARATION OF POWERS OPINION*
Walter Dellinger** and H. Jefferson Powell***
The prominence of judicial review in the history of constitutional interpretation in this republic often overshadows the essential and ongoing role of other institutions in the interpretation
of the Constitution of the United States. The finality of Supreme
Court decisions (barring reversal by the Court or by amendment)
plays a major-and appropriate-role in focusing our attention
on the courts' decisions, but other factors also shape our perceptions. It is, at least superficially, I easy to trace the course of Constitutional interpretation in the reported cases, and there is an
abundance of secondary literature. The history of congressional
and presidential interpretation, in contrast, is much less wellknown.z It is, furthermore, intrinsically more difficult to grasp.
Non-judicial interpretations of the Constitution are often implicit
rather than overt, embedded in political decisions that may include no express discussion of constitutional issues at all. The
collective nature of congressional action and the often-confidential character of executive branch deliberations add to the difficulties of working out the history of non-judicial interpretation.3
* The opinions expressed in this essay are ours-or Attorney General
Bradford's-and not necessarily those of the Department of Justice. We would like to
thank Kelly Conner for her assistance.
** Acting Solicitor General, United States Department of Justice; Professor of Law
(on leave), Duke University.
•** Principal Deputy Solicitor General, United States Department of Justice; Professor of Law (on leave), Duke University.
1. Even with respect to the courts, the easily accesible case reports are a partial and
potentially misleading basis on which to rest historical scholarship. Professor William
Casto's important new book on the Supreme Court's first decade reveals an active and
important institution that a lawyer confined to the pages of the United States Reports
would be unable to perceive. See William R. Casto, The Supreme Court in che Early
Republic (U. of South Carolina Press, !995).
2. The important history of constitutional interpretation by other institutions and
actors-lower executive branch officials, states, juries, non-governmental organizations,
and so on-is still more obscure.
3. The recent work of Professor David Currie on constitutional interpretation in
the First Congress is an important example of how much can be learned from a close
examination of congressional debate and action. See David P. Currie, The Conscicucion in
Congress: The Firs£ Congress and the Struccure of Government, 1789-179/, 2 U. Chi. L.
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At times, however, the problem is even more basic: the original materials necessary for understanding the development of
executive or congressional interpretation may simply be generally unavailable. A significant number of early opinions of the
Attorneys General, for example, never were collected in the official Opinions of the Attorneys General, the first volume of which
was published in 1852,4 and remain in manuscript or printed only
in out of print and inaccurate nineteenth-century books on other
subjects. This is true of what was, to our knowledge, the most
important opinion written by an Attorney General during the
1790s on an issue of separation of powers. What follows, after a
brief introduction to the context of that opinion, is a modern edition of that opinion, written by Attorney General William Bradford in 1794.s
I.

INTRODUCTION

From the beginning of the Union, one of the most important
modes of interaction between the President and Congress has
been the executive's submission of information for legislative
consideration. Article II of the Constitution requires that the
President "from time to time give to the Congress Information of
the State of the Union,"6 and the early Presidents evidently did
not regard that duty as satisfied by the ritual performance of an
annual address.? However, "Congress began almost immediately
to call for information not voluntarily submitted,"s and in short
order the question arose of whether the President has some degree of discretion in responding to such requests. The general
propriety of legislative requests for information and documents
was never in doubt: in April 1792, George Washington's cabinet
Sch. Roundtable 161 (1995); David P. Currie, The Conscitucion in Congress: Subscancive
Issues in the First Congress 1789-1791, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775 (1994). On the other hand,
the self-evidently labor-intensive nature of Currie's scholarship may well be a deterrent to
others!
4. Volume 1 of the official Opinions of the Attorneys General collects opinions
from the first Attorney General, Edmund Randolph, on, but has significant gaps in its
coverage.
5. The only previous publication of Bradford's opinion was a defective edition in
John C. Hamilton, ed., 4 Works of Alexander Hamilton 494-95 (J.F. Trow, 1851 ).
6. Art. II, sec. 3, cl. 1.
7. See, e.g., Abraham D. Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power 7778 (Ballinger Publishing Company, 1976) (discussing President Washington's practice of
sending "material to keep Congress informed of important developments, including matters that could have led to military actions"); id. at 176-77 (noting that President Jefferson's practice was similar to that of his predecessors). Our outline of the context of
Attorney General Bradford's opinion is dependent on the discussion in Sofaer's invaluable book.
8. ld. at 78.
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unanimously advised him that the House of Representatives was
entitled to request the transmission of documents in the executive's possession in order to carry out its functions.9 At the same
time, however, the cabinet was agreed that the President had the
duty and the authority not to transmit any documents, "the disclosure of which would injure the public" in his opinion.l 0
It is unclear whether, and to what extent, the cabinet's conclusion that the President could refuse to disclose information in
order to protect the public interest was communicated to the
House. Although Washington and his advisors did not think that
the public interest required withholding any of the requested
documents, no response was made until the House limited the
request to documents "of a public nature," at which point the
President complied.11 Two years later, however, Washington expressly exercised the authority to limit the disclosure of information to a house of Congress in the public interest.
On January 24, 1794, the Senate passed a resolution requesting the President "to lay before the Senate the correspondences
which have been had between the Minister of the United States
at the Republic of France and said Republic, and between said
Minister and the office of Secretary of State."Iz The minister in
question was the flamboyant Gouverneur Morris, whose patent
dislike of the Revolutionary regime in France had enraged that
government as well as its American sympathizers; some of the
9. The request arose out of congressional concern over the Wabash Nation's stunning defeat of the Army in November 1791 and initially was made by a special investigatory committee of the House and addressed to Secretary of War Henry Knox. Although
the cabinet members advised Washington that such requests properly should be addressed to the President rather than to a subordinate officer, they did not draw any distinction between the committee and the House as a whole. As Secretary of State Thomas
Jefferson wrote:
We had all considered, and were of one mind, first. that the House was an inquest, and therefore might institute inquiries. Second. that it might call for papers generally. Third, that the Executive ought to communicate such papers as
the public good would permit, and ought to refuse those, the disclosure of which
would injure the public: consequently were to exercise a discretion.
Jefferson, The Anas, in Andrew A. Lipscomb, ed., I The Writings of Thomas Jefferson
303-04 (Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903).
10. !d. at 304.
II. In addition to being a resolution of the House itself rather than the committee.
the second request for documents was addressed to the President rather than to Secretary
Knox. Sofaer concludes from this fact and the insertion of the "public nature" limitation
that the substance of the cabinet's advice to Washington had been communicated to the
House. Sofaer, Constitutional Power at 82 (cited in note 7). However, he notes an ambiguity in the limiting language, which could be read either to recognize a public-interest
qualification along the lines of the cabinet opinion or simply to exclude the papers of
private persons from the request. I d. at 82-83 (concluding that the House probably intended the public-interest construction of its language).
12. ld. at 83.
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resolution's supporters no doubt saw the request as a means of
embarrassing the Federalist administration in the person of one
of its most partisan officers. After reviewing his files, Secretary
of State Edmund Randolph informed Washington that Morris's
correspondence did contain passages that it would be impolitic to
disclose for various reasons.13
As in 1792, Washington asked the advice of his cabinet on
the proper response to the Senate resolution. At a meeting of
the three secretaries on January 28, they agreed to advise the
President that he was not obligated to comply with the letter of
the resolution, although they disagreed over the extent of the discretion he could or should exercise in withholding material.14
Secretary of War Henry Knox and Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton opined that the President should transmit "no
part of the correspondences," although Hamilton conceded that
"the principle [presumably, of discretion to withhold diplomatic
correspondence] is safe, by excepting such parts as the President
may choose to withold."1s Secretary Randolph believed that the
President should deliver "all the correspondence, proper from its
nature to be communicated to the Senate ... , but that what the
President thinks improper, should not be sent."16 The differences within the cabinet that the opinion reveals are interesting,
although their importance should not be exaggerated: it was
common ground that the President was not bound by the fact
that the Senate had expressed no public-interest (or indeed, any
other) limitation on the documents it requested and that the decision of how to comply with the resolution, if at all, was the
President's. The high officers of the Washington administration
remained committed to the position that, at least with respect to
requests by a single house, the President enjoys significant discretion to control the disclosure of information.
13. While Randolph thought that Morris's letters included "little of what is exceptionable, .. he did recommend that Washington withhold certain passages:
(1) what related to Mr. G[ene]t [the controversial French minister to the United
States]; (2) some harsh expressions of the conduct of the rulers of France, which
if returned to that country, might expose him [Morris] to danger; (3) the authors
of some interesting information, who, if known would be infallibly denounced.
Randolph to Washington (Jan. 26, 1794), in Sofaer, Constitutional Power at 83 n. * (cited in
note 7).
14. The cabinet members jointly signed an opinion that expressed each individual
member's view. See Opinion on Communicating to the Senate the Dispatches of
Gouverneur Morris (Jan. 28, 1794), in Harold C. Syrett, ed., 15 Papers of Alexander Hamilton 666-67 (Columbia U. Press, 1%9).
15. !d. at 667.
16. ld.
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President Washington's practice of obtaining formal, written
opinions from the heads of departments on difficult questions of
law and policy did not prevent him from seeking the legal views
of his Attorney General as well.J7 At the time the Senate passed
the Morris resolution, there was, in fact, no Attorney General,
but the day before the cabinet met and formulated its opinion,
President Washington appointed William Bradford to the vacant
office.Js Bradford had served in the Continental Army, and was
then appointed attorney general of Pennsylvania in 1780. Despite his youth and inexperience,J9 Bradford served with distinction for more than a decade and was elevated to the state
supreme court in 1791. His greatest accomplishment was his successful attempt to curtail the use of capital punishment: he is
credited with wielding decisive influence on the Pennsylvania
legislature's decision in 1794 to eliminate the death penalty for
all crimes except first degree murder.
The proper response to the Senate resolution calling for the
Morris correspondence was the first question Washington put to
17. It should be noted that Washington played a crucial role in shaping the concept
of the heads of the departments as a presidential "cabinet.'' The original constitutional
text nowhere refers to the heads of the executive departments as a cabinet, although it
empowers the President to require from any of them "the Opinion, in writing ... upon
any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices." U.S. Con st., Art. II, sec. 2,
cl. 1. However. Washington's own wartime experiences (and British example) led him to
treat the three original secretaries as, individually and collectively, a council of advisors
on whatever matters he deemed appropriate. See Glenn A. Phelps, George Washington
and American Constitutionalism 162-63 (U. Press of Kansas, 1993). The Attorney General, not being the head of a department before 1870, was not subject to Article ll's
Opinion Clause, but the provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that established the office
required the Attorney General to advise the President on legal matters. See Act of Sept.
24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93. Washington's Attorneys General often participated in cabinet
deliberations. See. e.g., Jefferson, Anas at 303 (cited in note 9).
18. The first Attorney General (Randolph) had become Secretary of State at the
beginning of January. It is surprisingly difficult to determine on precisely which day
Bradford assumed the office of Attorney General: many sources state that he was appointed on January 28, although President Washington's journal of his official acts records
that he "(s)igned a Commission for William Bradford. being appointed Attorney General
for the US." on Jan. 27, 1794. Dorothy Twohig, ed., Papers of George Washington: The
Journal of the Proceedings of the President 1793-1797 at 280 (U. Press of Virginia, 1981).
19. Bradford was born in 1755 and graduated from Princeton in 1772. His legal
studies were interrupted by the outbreak of the war. in the course of which he rose from
private to colonel before health problems compelled him to resign from the Continental
Army in 1779. After a brief additional period of legal study, Bradford was admitted to
the bar the same year. He thus was 25 and a member of the bar for only a year when he
became state attorney general. Bradford's early advancement may not have been entirely
a recognition of his personal abilities: his father, the printer William Bradford. was a great
figure in the Patriot movement of the 1770s. For this information. we have relied on the
brief essays on Bradford in Arthur Robb, Biographical Sketches of the Attorneys General:
Edmund Randolph to Tom C. Clark (2d ed. 1946), and in Allen Johnson. ed .. Dictionary
of American Biography 566 (Charles Scribner's Sons. 1964).
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Attorney General Bradford. His opinion is undated, but the reference in the opinion to the resolution shows that he wrote it
before the end of January. Bradford came to the same practical
judgment that the cabinet members had reached: the President
had the authority to transmit to the Senate only those parts of
the Morris correspondence that he deemed proper to disclose.
Unlike the conclusory advice of the three secretaries, however,
his opinion is a succinct, and even elegant, statement of his reasoning. Bradford grounded the President's authority over the
disclosure of diplomatic information-he termed it a "duty"-on
both constitutional principle and the nature of diplomacy.zo
"[T]he rights of the executive and the nature of foreign correspondences require" that documents that "in the judgment of the
Executive shall be deemed unsafe and improper to be disclosed"
should be withheld.zJ
At the same time that Bradford apparently asserted presidential authority to disregard the terms of the Senate resolution,
he argued that the President appropriately might interpret the
resolution as not requiring of him action contrary to "the rights
of the Executive."zz The Senate's resolution, Bradford reasoned, ought to be construed on the presumption that the Senate
had acted with respect both for the necessity of confidentiality
and for the President's responsibilities. "[I]t could scarcely be
supposed even if the words were stronger that the Senate intended to include any Letters the disclosure of which might endanger national honour or individual safety."z3 The fact that the
letter of the resolution seemed to call for the Morris correspondence in its entirety, therefore, did not "exclude, in the construction of it" the exercise of executive discretion to withhold
material that "any circumstances may render improper to be
communicated. "24
President Washington ultimately acted in accordance with
the advice of his cabinet and of Attorney General Bradford and
on February 26, 1794, transmitted to the Senate a redacted set of
the requested documents. As the President's cover letter to the
Senate explained: "After an examination of [the Morris correspondence], I directed copies and translations to be made; except
in those particulars which, in my judgment, for public considera20.
brary of
21.
22.

23.
24.

Attorney General Bradford's Opinion, Washington Papers (on file with the LiCongress).
Id.
Id.
Id.
ld.
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tions, ought not to be communicated."zs The Senate did not protest Washington's mode of compliance with its request, and,
indeed, Secretary of State Randolph informed the President that
his action "appears to have given general satisfaction," and, in
particular, that Congressman James Madison had agreed in conversation that "the discretion of the President was always to be
the guide" in such matters.26
The 1794 Senate resolution was not President Washington's
last encounter with the relationship between the President's control over sensitive information and congressional document requests, although Bradford's death the following year prevented
him from further involvement in the issue.n The most famous
incident involved the demand by the House of Representatives
in March 1796 for all documents relating to the negotiation of the
controversial Jay Treaty with Great Britain.zs On that occasion,
Washington flatly refused to comply with the House's resolution,
in part because he viewed the resolution as an unconstitutional
intrusion into the treaty power shared by the President and the
Senate.29 However, Washington also invoked the argument from
the nature and necessities of diplomacy that his second Attorney
General had presented two years before.

25. Sofaer, Consrirutional Power at 84 (cited in note 7).
26. See id. at 85 n.*.
27. Bradford died on August 23. 1795. Johnson, ed., Dictionary of American Biography at 566 (cited in note 19).
28. For a collection of the most important documents, with commentary, see H. Jefferson Powell, Languages of Power 104-13 (Carolina Academic Press, 1991).
29. In his recent book on Washington's constitutional thought and practice, Glenn
~helps states_that Washington's 1796 refusal "was based not on a general claim of executive prerogative, but rather on a constitutional interpretation that narrowed the House's
role in foreign affairs." Phelps. George Washingwn at 177 (cited in note 17). Although
we admire Phelps's important work. this assertion seems to overstate the extent to which
Washington presented only one argument for his position. In any event, Phelps does not
questiOn Washington's acceptance in principle of the sort of arguments Bradford made in
1794. See id. at 172-78.
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ATIORNEY GENERAL BRADFORD'S OPINIQN3o

The Attorney General has the honour to report,
That having considered the Resolve of the Senate of the
24th instant whereby the President of the United States
is requested to lay before that body the correspondence
which has been had between the minister of the FI-ench
R United States at the French Republic and the said
Republic and between said Minister and the office
of Secretary of State --He is of opinion that it is the duty of the Executive to withhold such parts of the said correspondence
as in the judgment of the Executive shall be deemed
unsafe and improper to be disclosed. He also conceives that the general terms of the resolve do
not exclude, in the construction of it, those just
exceptions which the rights of the executive and
the nature of foreign correspondences require. Every
call of this nature, where the correspondence is
secret and no specific object pointed at, must
be presumed to proceed upon the idea that the
papers requested are proper to be communicated[;]
& it could scarcely be supposed, even if the words
were stronger[,] that the Senate intended to include
any Letters[,] the disclosure of which might endanger national honour or individual safety.
The Attorney General is therefore of opinion,
That it will be advisable for the President to communicate to the Senate such parts of the said
Correspondence as upon examination he shall deem
safe & proper to dislose: withholding all such, as
any circumstances may render improper to be
communicated.
Wm Bradford
The President of the United States

30. The following transcription reproduces Randolph's handwritten text, which is
preserved in the Washington Papers in the Library of Congress. The layout attempts to
replicate the appearance of the originals.

